For three decades I was on the same side
as the authors of the updates meaning I or my team were
preparing such World Bank documents; I would often wonder
how useful these documents were and to which audience? Now I
am on the other side as a reader of the report and have a
chance to answer that question; and my answer is that such
documents are potentially very useful to a broad range of
people including the development community, academics, the
private sector, media and government.
I appreciate the present report for several reasons: it is
short and well-written; it draws attention to some important
economic issues relating to investment and exports; and it
also draws attention to long run issues relating to
nutrition and urban development.
Low investment rate
I appreciate the attention drawn to the
stagnation of total investment in Pakistan and its
implications for long run growth; the comparison with South
Asia is apt; Low private investment is of particular concern
The explanation for low investment rates is sought in some
recent events such as the global growth slowdown and energy
shortages; and also in the volatile security situation
But private investment has been low for a much longer time
than the last five or six years; I believe this topic
deserves fuller treatment in a subsequent PDU on the basis
of some econometric analysis
There is however one somewhat ironic aspect of the low
investment rate. For Pakistan to get its present growth rate
of 4.7% with an investment rate of just above 15% of GDP
suggests a pretty high level of investment efficiency.
Decline in share of world exports
Good to point to decline in share of world exports; this
should worry us more than the ups and downs of current
account balances; this is a real structural problem; is it
due to exchange rate appreciation? Declining
competitiveness?
This should also get more attention in some future PDU and
also on the basis of fresh econometric work;
CPEC
Why no discussion of CPEC? This is a striking omission given
the importance given to the matter by the Government as well
as the observation of a low overall investment rate
Comments on poverty section
The section on poverty and wellbeing makes the following
points:
a. Poverty declined rapidly from 2001 to 2008; then it
declined at a slower pace until 2014
b. Some aspects of wellbeing corroborated this poverty
decline; for example, school enrolment rates, particularly
for girls, increased sharply between 2001 and 2008;
ownership of assets such as motorbikes increased among the
poor;
c. The share of food items in total consumption decreased;
this was a result of improving diets shifting towards lower
calorie foods; and not of a food squeeze arising from high
prices
d. While other aspects of wellbeing, such as stunting, did
not improve much, this had more to do with the failure of
government to provide good sanitation and clean drinking
water than with the availability of food
This is fine as far as it goes. But it
does not go far enough. Two extensions would have helped.
First, this section could have benefited from a little
comparative analysis. How well Pakistan has done in
converting income growth among the bottom 20% into wellbeing
(changes in child mortality, stunting rates and school
enrolment rates) could have been better established by
comparing Pakistan's experience with some neighbors or other
comparators. What is the elasticity of school enrolment or
stunting in Pakistan with respect to income growth and how
does it compare with say India or Bangladesh or Nepal?
Second, child mortality data should have been used in
addition to school enrolment and asset acquisition as
measures of family wellbeing.
Research I have done recently shows that Pakistan has a
higher rate of child mortality in its poorest quintile than
India, Bangladesh and Nepal; this is surprising given the
lower rate of poverty in Pakistan
Comments on nutrition section
Good to have put some basic data out in the public domain;
it is startling to learn that Pakistan has the third highest
rate of stunting in the world...12 million children are
stunted
No improvement has taken place in the last three decades
Highest rates of stunting are in Sindh and Balochistan
Poor sanitation practices and lack of clean safe water are
probably among the more important causes of stunting but
many other factors are also involved
The fact that significant poverty reduction has not resulted
in significant improvements in stunting suggests that more
than private income growth is needed. Just generating
private income growth, even at the lower quintile level,
will not help if the delivery of certain government services
is not assured. Income growth alone is not sufficient. It
needs to be supplemented by the delivery of safe water,
better and information about good nutrition, good health
practices and good sanitation options.
The last section on the nutrition policy agenda says the
requisite things about inter-ministerial and
inter-government coordination, higher budget allocations to
nutrition, and multi-sectoral investments.
But more could have been said about policy choices. Should
governments aim for nutrition specific interventions or cash
grants? What does the empirical literature say about the
choice between cash versus in-kind aid to families deemed to
be food-insecure? Or is this primarily a matter of educating
households in good nutritional practices?
Comments on the Karachi City Diagnostic (based on inputs
from Professor Nausheen Anwar)
The descriptive part of the Diagnostic feels accurate. The
city is beset by crowding, traffic congestion, air
pollution, road hazards, uncollected garbage, unsafe
drinking water, open sewers, noise, lack of public transport
options...did I miss anything?
There are some very shocking statistics: mass transport
units account for only 5% of vehicles; the city is
overwhelmingly reliant on unsafe, polluting private
transport like motorcycles; Only 55% of water requirements
are met daily.
Satellite evidence suggests a decline of light intensity or
luminosity in central Karachi and an increase at the
periphery. This is both novel and interesting. The report
suggests that it is worrisome for the city's long run
economic potential but it does not explain why. Does the
same pattern and trend exist in other Pakistani cities? Some
more discussion of this claim would have been useful,
especially for the non-specialists.
The report claims that Karachi's competitiveness has
declined relative to other cities in Pakistan and across the
region. But no data are provided. It is possible that the
data are available in the larger report that is mentioned in
the footnote. It would have been useful to provide some
relevant tables in this report as well.
The report claims that urban planning, management and
service delivery have not kept pace with population growth
in Karachi. To those of us who live and work and drive and
breathe here, this is a huge understatement. The report is
right to point out that the situation is not improving.
The report makes a very good point in noting that municipal
functions are highly uncoordinated and fragmented across 20
different agencies who control 90% of the land in the city.
It might have drawn attention as well to governance problems
in land transactions and urban planning. A lot of money is
made in the land and property development business. It might
serve the interests of some groups to keep municipal
development programs uncoordinated and fragmented. The land
mafia contains state groups as well.
On the policy side, perhaps some attempt should have been
made to discuss the role of civil society and NGOs in
improving town planning and land use in the city.
The diagnostic and policy section is politics and
governance-free; but city management in Karachi is deeply
and thoroughly entwined with politics and governance
problems. Technical solutions will not be sufficient.